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JURISDICTION 
Rp««P" »nrjoi i \A 'orkers Compensation Fund of Utah (the """Fund") and 
Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co. (the "Employer") agree with and adopl 11 u 
statement of jurisdictioii widow of the 
Jereasp-I i , I IM Greqnry I. Ulsun ' " ' Msun ) regarding Petitioner's appeal from a 
decision of Industrial Commission of Utah (the "Commissioi i"). 
. nursTioNS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. First Issue: The following issu* preserved before the 
Commission. See Defendants" Memoraru >• " "" i"1? "Tr'< ord at 
Whether the Industrial Commission of Utah correctly 
decided that Olsen was excluded from workers 
compensation coverage when it concluded the Employer 
was required to give only one written notice to the Fund 
and the Commission to satisfy the notice provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3)(b). 
btandard of Review: I ho > in i . IHPSS siai laid is applied to 
* oecific law for whit ; r juency has not been granted implicit 
' e-xLiit idiscretie '""'" Code A~~ * * l t d 4 )(< :!); MUCUI i..mu M State i ax 
C o m m i 
B. Second Issue: The following issue was presented to the Commission 
by Respondent. See Defendants jthorities, Record 
Whether, in the alternative, the revised notice provisions 
of Utah Code Ann § 35-1-43(4) which eliminated any 
i 
requirement to give notice to the Commission should be 
applied retroactively to deny Petitioner's claims. 
Standard of Review: The correction of error standard is applied to agency 
interpretations of general law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Zissi v. Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Interpretation of then Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-43(3)(b) (1993) 
and application of the revised version of this statute, now designated as § 35 -1 -
43(4), are determinative in the case. The 1993 version read as fol lows: 
A corporation may elect to not include any director or 
officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve wri t ten notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the Commission naming the persons to be excluded from 
coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee under this Chapter until the 
notice has been given. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b)(1993). 
The 1 995 revision of this statute reads as fol lows: 
A corporation may elect not to include any director or 
officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve writ ten notice upon its insurance carrier naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or 
officer of a corporation is considered an employee under 
this Chapter until the notice has been given. (Emphasis 
added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(4)(1995). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
Applicant and Petitioner, the widow of Olsen, applied for workers 
compensation benefits as the surviving spouse of Olsen who died in an auto/train 
accident on June 3, 1994. At the time of the accident, Olsen was President of the 
Employer. The Fund denied the Applicants' claim for benefits because more than 
one year prior to the fatal accident, Olsen, as president of the Employer and 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3), gave the Fund written notice to exclude Olsen as 
an employee for workers compensation purposes. Record at p. 66. The Fund then 
sent a computer tape as notice of Olsen's exclusion to the Commission as required 
by law. As a result of this notice, the Fund issued a rider to the Employer which 
formalized the exclusion of Olsen from coverage under the policy and the Fund 
discontinued collecting premiums for Olsen. 
On November 16, 1995, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio 
(the "ALJ") ruled that both the Employer and the Fund were liable for paying the 
claimed death benefits because Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) required the 
Employer to give separate written notice of the election directly to the Commission 
as well at to the Fund. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, 
Petitioner's "Addendum B,f.) 
On November 30, 1995, the Fund and Employer filed a Motion for 
Review with the Industrial Commission. On June 10, 1996, the Commission 
reversed the ALJ's decision in its Order Granting Motion for Review (the 
3 
"Commission's Order")(See Addendum C, Petitioner's Brief) and denied Petitioner's 
claim for benefits. The Commission concluded that the notice provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) had been satisfied by the Employer because the 
statutes did not require separate writ ten notice to each the Fund and the 
Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The following additional facts are included in the Commission's Order: 
In a letter dated January 1, 1992 and signed by Olsen as the Employer's 
president, the Employer instructed the Fund as fol lows: "Please exclude the 
undersigned, Gregory J . Olsen, an officer and director of the policy holder, from 
further coverage under the policy effective January 1, 1992 and until further 
notice." (Commission's Order, Record at p. 105, See Addendum C, Petitioner's 
Brief.) The Fund then mailed the Employer, to Olsen's attention, a form entitled 
"Corporate Officer/Director Exclusion Form" which explained that upon receipt by 
the Fund of the signed form from the Employers, any officers and directors of the 
Employer listed on the form would no longer be employees for purposes of workers' 
compensation benefits. (Commission's Order, Record at p. 106.) On February 3, 
1992, the Employer returned the form signed by Olsen as president of the company 
and listing Olsen as the only officer/director to be excluded. (Commission's Order, 
Record at p. 106.) Although the Employer did not provide separate notice to the 
Commission that it had excluded Olsen from coverage, the Fund notified the 
Commission "in the usual and customary manner, by means of magnetic tape 
4 
which was downloaded into the Industrial Commission's records." (Commission's 
Order, Record at p. 106.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The notice given by the Employer to exclude Olsen as a covered employee 
for workers compensation purposes was effective because either (1) the notice 
complied wi th the provisions of U.C.A. § 35-1-43(b)(3) which does not require 
separate notice, or in the alternative (2) the superseding provisions of U.C.A. § 35-
1-43(4) as amended in 1995 should be given retroactive effect as a change in 
notice requirements without any change in substantive benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OLSEN WAS EXCLUDED AS AN EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF WORKERS 
COMPENSATION BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER GAVE NOTICE TO BOTH THE FUND 
AND THE COMMISSION THROUGH THE FUND. 
A. The Employer Was Required to Give Only One Written Notice to Both the 
Fund and the Commission. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to dependant 
survivors of employees covered by the Act who die as a result of an accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment. U.C.A. § 35-1-45. Officers and 
directors of corporations are covered employees unless the corporation elects to 
exclude them as employees by complying with the requirements for opting out of 
coverage. At the time of Olsen's accident, these opt out requirements were set 
forth in U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b) which read as follows: 
5 
A corporation may elect to not include any director or 
officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the Commission naming the persons to be excluded from 
coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee under this Chapter until the 
notice has been given. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b), U.C.A. (1993). The primary question on appeal 
is whether the Employer's written notice to the Fund, which notice the Fund then 
transmitted to the Commission as required by law, was effective to exclude Olsen 
as an employee for workers' compensation purposes. The Commission decided the 
notice was effective because the statute does not require separate notice to each 
of the Fund and the Commission. The position taken by Petitioner, on the other 
hand, is that this statute required the Employer to give two written notices, one to 
each the Fund and the Commission. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "proper construction of a statute 
must further its purposes." RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Com'n, 741 P.2d 
948, 951 (Utah 1987). And, because a statute is to be construed in light of its 
intended purpose, substantial compliance with a notice statute may satisfy the 
statutory intent. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (1980). The 
purpose of a requirement to give notice is for the benefit of the party who is to 
receive the notice, not for the benefit of the party giving the notice. Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). And, effective notice need only "be 
of such nature as to reasonably to convey the required information....". kL 
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In this case, there is no dispute that the Employer gave written notice to the 
Fund that it elected to have Olsen excluded as an employee for workers1 
compensation coverage. Petitioner's Statements of Facts; Record at p. 4 1 . The 
Fund responded by cancelling coverage as to Olsen by issuing a rider to the 
Employer (General Endorsement, Record at p. 7 1 , See Addendum) and gave notice 
to the Commission of the cancellation. ( Affidavit of Brad Christenson, Record at 
pp. 37-38.) The Fund and Commission have elected this method of compliance 
with U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b) (Commission's Order, Record at 106,) in part because 
the Fund is already required to provide exactly the same information to the 
Commission, pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 35-1-471 and 31A-22-10022 , both of which 
require notice by the Fund to the Commission of all policy cancellations before such 
cancellations are effective. Therefore, by operation of these statutes, the 
Commission received the notice required by § 35-1-43(3)(b) through the Fund. 
1
 Section 35-1-47 (1986) reads in part: (1) Every insurance carrier 
writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in this state or for this state, ... 
shall file notification of that coverage with the Industrial Commission or its designee 
with 30 days after the inception date of the policy on forms prescribed by the 
Workers' Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission. These policies will 
be in effect from inception until canceled by filing with the commission or its 
designee a notification of cancellation on forms prescribed by the Workers' 
Compensation Division within ten days after the cancellation of a policy. 
2
 Section 31 A-22-1002 : (1) Any insurer assuming a workers' 
compensation risk shall carry it until the policy is canceled, either: 
(a) by agreement between the Industrial Commission, the insurer, and the 
employer; or 
(b) after 30 days notice by the insurer to the employer, and after notice to 
the Industrial Commission as provided in Section 35-1-47. 
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Given these facts, the Commission correctly decided that the notice given by 
the employer was adequate to exclude Olsen as an employee for purposes of 
workers compensation benefits. This well-established method of giving notice to 
the Commission meets the purpose of such notice, allowing both the Fund and 
Commission to monitor coverage, and to do so without having to create a 
bureaucratic procedure of matching separate notices submitted to each entity. 
Where a notice requirement is intended to serve as a shield to the Fund and 
Commission, it should not now be allowed to serve as a sword against the Fund. 
This result cannot have been intended by the Legislature. 
B. Allowing the Employer to Obtain Coverage Without Paving Premiums 
Produces an Absurd Result Which Is Ineguitable and Should Be Estopped. 
When a strictly literal interpretation of a statute produces results which are 
absurd, then the Commission and courts are entitled to narrow the literal scope of 
the statute. RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Com'n, 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 
1 987). Utah law frowns on allowing a party to profit from its own mistakes. 
Midwest Realty v. City of West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (failure of city to strictly 
comply wi th statute did not excuse city from making payment.) 
Utah also recognizes the law of equitable estoppel "which precludes parties 
from asserting their fights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to 
assert those rights." Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App. 1990). 
Estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) an act or statement by one party 
inconsistent wi th a later asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or 
8 
inaction based on the first party's action or statement, and (3) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the first party to repudiate its act or 
statement. ]cL 
Petitioner's reliance on an Arizona case, Hacker v. Industrial 
Commission of Arizona, 758 P.2d 662, 157 Ariz. 391 (Arizona App. 1988) is 
misplaced. First, the Arizona case does not provide a precedent for Utah. Second, 
the issues in the Hacker case are not the same as here. There, the question was 
whether the person giving the notice had the capacity to give such notice. That is 
not at issue in this case. Pursuant to Arizona statute an employee could make a 
pre-injury election of remedies for work related injuries, i.e. receive workers' 
compensation or, in the alternative, retain the right to sue the employer. Hacker, 
758 P.2d at 664. The insurers raised estoppel and equity arguments that notice 
was effective even though the employee did not give the notice. The Arizona 
court rejected these arguments because this election of remedies resulted from a 
constitutional amendment which the court found to be an expression of public 
policy; and, "no contractual consent, .... no laches nor estoppel can prevail against 
public policy. Hacker, 758 P.2d at 665, citing Red Rover Copper Co. v. Industrial 
Com'n, 58 Ariz. 203, 118 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1941). In this case, there is no such 
constitutional mandate barring equitable considerations. 
The Arizona court also found that, in addition to giving notice, the statutory 
notice formality in the Hacker case may help to protect the employee from his own 
improvidence or folly in electing remedies. Hacker, 758 P.2d at 665. In the 
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present case, the employer can make the election without any notice or 
consideration to the employee, so guarding against improvidence or folly on the 
part of the employee cannot be a purpose of the Utah statute. In this case the 
notice requirement is strictly for the benefit of the party receiving the notice. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1212. 
Here, the Employer clearly had the burden to give the required notice and 
was in the best position to ensure that it complied with any notice requirement. 
The Fund was entitled to and did rely on the notice it received by reducing 
premiums, issuing an exclusion to coverage and notifying the Commission of the 
exclusion. To now allow the Employer in this case to obtain coverage from an 
insurer without paying premiums because the Employer itself failed to comply with 
a notice requirement imposed on the Employer would produce an absurd and 
inequitable result not intended by the Legislature. To rule otherwise would be to 
allow the fox to police the henhouse. 
II. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE 1995 AMENDMENT TO § 35-1-43(3)(b), 
U.C.A.,WHICH ELIMINATED NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION WAS A CHANGE IN A 
PROCEDURE AND SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
In 1995, the legislature amended U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b), now designated 
as § 35-1-43(4), to read as follows: 
A corporation may elect not to include any director or 
officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or 
10 
officer of a corporation is considered an employee under 
this Chapter until the notice has been given. (Emphasis 
added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(4) U.C.A. (1995). This amendment was clearly 
intended to eliminate the requirement to give notice to the Commission, either 
directly or indirectly. Consequently, Applicant's claim must be denied if the 
revised statute is applied retroactively. 
The general rule is that revision of a statute "cannot be given retroactive 
effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute." 
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah App. 
1990). However, as an exception the general rule, a statute is applied retroactively 
where it changes only procedural law by providing a different mode for enforcing 
substantive rights: 
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation 
of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested or contractual rights apply not only to future 
actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well. 
ld^, citing Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). An amendment to a 
statute is a procedural change where it "merely affects the legal machinery by 
which the parties enforce their rights under the contract, " kL citing Pilcher v. 
State, 663 P.2d at 455, "or simply clarifies the legislature's previous intentions." 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that an amendment to a statute 
which changed and clarified a notice requirement was retroactive and applied to a 
case then pending. Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979). 
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On its face, the amendment to § 35-1-43(4) U.C.A. was a clarification that 
notice to the Commission was not required for an employer to make an effective 
election to exclude an officer from the definition of "employee." The requirement 
to give separate notice to the Commission has never served any purpose or even 
been observed except as the Fund has notified the Commission by computer tape. 
Even prior to the amendment, the Commission did not approve or disapprove 
coverage of corporate officers. The Commission has used the computer tape only 
as evidence of statutory compliance by the Fund. Clearly the procedure established 
between the Fund and Commission recognizes that no separate notice be given 
from an employer. 
Therefore, the amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-43(4) should be applied 
retroactively. The Employer was only required to give notice to the Fund and the 
alleged failure to give notice to the Commission did not make the Employer's 
election to exclude Olsen ineffective. 
III. 
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE NOTICE BE RECOGNIZED AS EFFECTIVE. 
A. A Decision That Olsen Was an Employee for Workers Compensation 
Purposes Would Create a Conflict Between the Fund and the Employer That 
Would be Contrary to Public Policy. 
The Commission's decision should not be set aside for public policy reasons. 
A decision to the contrary would be to interfere with the contractual relationship 
between the Fund and the Employer. The insurance policy between the Fund and 
the Employer creates a "duty [of the Fund] to defend at our expense any claim, 
12 
proceeding, or suit against the Employer for benefits payable by this insurance." 
(Policy, Coverage A, Record at p. 69, See Addendum.) The Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that this duty requires the insurer to "be as zealous in protecting the 
interests of the insured as it would be in regard to its own." Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985); citing Lvon v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 3 1 1 , 319, 480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971). 
If Olsen were found to be an employee, rather than guarding the interests of 
the Employer, the Fund would be placed in the position of having to challenge the 
Employer as to whether the policy of insurance covered Olsen. Being a covered 
employee and an insured employee are two different considerations. It does not 
necessarily follow that the Employer had insurance for Olsen. 
An employer has the option of buying insurance or, if qualfied, being self-
insured for its liability for employees' workers compensation benefits. If the 
employer fails to insure or qualify for self-insurance, it is liable for tort remedies as 
well as compensation benefits. U.C.A. § 35-1-57. The question of whether an 
employee is insured is a matter of contract between the insurer and the employer. 
Because the Fund relied on the Employer's notice that Olsen was to be excluded 
from coverage under the policy, it would have to take the position that Olsen was 
an uninsured employee and Applicant must look only to the Employer and not the 
Fund for the claimed benefits. Such a dispute would put the Fund in conflict with 
its duty to Employer which is contrary to public policy. 
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B. A Finding That the Established Notice Procedure is Ineffective Would Create 
Chaos With Regard to Coverage With All Corporate Employers Which Elected 
Not to Cover Officers. 
A decision against The Fund and the Commission would also create a 
potentially wide-spread chaotic situation regarding the exposure of the Fund to 
claims of any insured which had not given the required notice. To protect against a 
new area of risk without having provided actuarially determined reserves, the Fund 
would have to attempt to collect premiums from all such employers retroactively 
since it relied on the established notice procedure to reduce premiums. Even 
though the Fund has retroactively assessed premiums in the past, the public will 
not be served if the Fund, which insures over 26,500 employers, most of which 
are small companies, is required to identify all employers which have elected out of 
coverage for officers and directors and then attempt to assess premiums 
retroactively to cover its risk. Such a result has the potential to tie up significan 
amounts of court time, would be inequitable to all employers who acted in good 
faith in giving notice through the established procedure, and is contrary to public 
policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The well-established and long-observed method of transmitting notice of the 
Employer's election to exclude workers compensation coverage for officers and 
directors meets the requirements of U.C.A § 35-1-43(3)(b). In the alternative, the 
provisions of the revised notice requirement, U.C.A § 35-1-43(4) which eliminates 
any notice to the Commission should be applied retroactively to deny Petitioner's 
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claimed benefits. If the notice was ineffective, it is equitable that the burden of 
failing to properly exclude an officer of the company from coverage as an employee 
for workers compensation purposes should fall on the Employer who had the duty 
to give proper notice to the required parties. The Employer, not the Fund, was in 
the best position to see that the notice burden was satisfied. This is especially true 
in the present case where Olsen himself was the person who personally requested 
that he be dropped from coverage; where he signed two documents to that effect; 
and, where he was also the president of the company and an attorney who is 
presumed to know the law. 
The Fund asks the Court to affirm the decision of the Commission that 
neither the Employer nor the Fund are liable for the claimed compensation, and for 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
DATED t h i s J ^ ^ d a y o f x ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ £ , 1996. 
^kjU^f 
raid J. Lc 
DREDGE & LALLATIN, LC . 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 5^"7>> day of^g/vI^r^K. 
1996 to the following: 
Eugene Miller 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Attorney for Applicant 
gal\dlsen3.brf 
Attorney for Respondents 
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ADDENDUM 
1. AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD CHRISTENSEN, Record at pp. 37-38. 
2. POLICY, COVERAGE A, Record at p. 69. 
3. GENERAL ENDORSEMENT, Record at p. 71. 
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JANET L. MOFFITT, No. 2287 
Attorney for Defendants 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 288-8149 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of 





WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, BRAD CHRISTENSON, having been duly sworn upon oath, does depose and say: 
1. That I am employed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah with offices at 392 East 
6400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107, telephone number 288-8077. 
2. That in connection with my employment, I have access to and am familiar with the 
preparation of weekly computer tapes sent to the Industrial Commission and that said tapes contain all 





* AFFIDAVIT OF 
* BRAD CHRISTENSON 




3. That information concerning the deletion of coverage for corporate officers for Samuel 
Mclntyre Investments was received by the Workers Compensation Fund and entered into the computer 
on March 30, 1993. 
4. That a copy of the computer tape containing 'he deletion information was provided to the 
Industrial Commission in the tape transmitted during the week following the entry. 
5. That the same information has been transmitted on a repeated basis to the Industrial 
Commission via the weekly tape thereafter. 
DATED this / % day of Je^c/si^ — 1995. 
BRAD CHRISTENSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /±_ day of September, 1995/ 
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IMPORTANT — PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY and become thoroughly familiar with its 
provisions. A few moments attention right now may save misunderstanding in the future. 
This policy is a contract of insurance between the Employer 
nsteo on tne aeciaration page and trie Workers Compensation 
Fund ot Ulan, neremarter reierred to as the -Fund." Tne only 
agreements relating to this insurance are stated in this policy. 
The terms of this policy may not be changed or waived except 
by endorsement issued by the Fund to be part of this policy. 
In return for the payment ot the premium and subject to all the 
terms ot this policy, the Fund agrees with the employer as 
follows: 
COVERAGE A 
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE 
The Fund does hereby agree with the Employer named on the 
declaration page to insure the employer against liability for 
compensation under the Utah Wortcmen's Compensation Act 
and the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. as provided 
in Chapters 1.2. and 3 of Title 35. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
and alt amenoments thereto and other relevant Utah statutes. 
including liability to pay for medical and other treatment and 
care of injured employees as required by said Acts. Workmen's 
compensation acts and laws from jurisdictions other tnan the 
State ot Utah shall not govern this policy. 
This woncers Compensation insurance applies to bodily injury 
by accioent or bodily injury by disease as those terms are 
detineo in the Utah Wornmen's Comoensatton Act. tne Utah 
Occuoauonai Disease Disability Law. and by the Utah Supreme 
Cotlrt Undilv ihmrv irwti irt*« inn ins f *cnlhAn in t a a t h Astrfilw 
injury by accident must occur during the policy penod. Bodily 
injury by disease must be caused, or aggravate^ by the 
conditions of employment (See Sec 35*2-1. et seq. Utah Code 
Annotated). The employee's last injurious exposure to the 
conditions giving rise to the ciaim must occur during tne policy 
period. 
The Fund will pay promptly, when due. the oenefits required by 
the Utah workmen's Compensation Act and/or the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law. The Fund has me right 
and duty to dofend at ogr expense any claim, proceeding, or suit 
against the Employer for oenefits payable by this insurance. It is 
specifically understood that the Fund nas the right to cnoose 
counsel to represent the Employer in-any cause ot action 
covered under this policy. The Fund has the right to investigate 
12/G3/1995 12:89 8812888838 
m Wmw* Workers J£ L Compensation Fund of Utah 
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Safe and Sound Thiniting 
GENERAL ENDORSEMENT 
Date Issued: 01/30/95 
Attention: WILLIAM QUINCY 
SAMOEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT CO 
11009 ARCH TERRACE 
AUSTIN TX 787S0 
Policy NO: 1349373 
Telephone No: (410)721-9171 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES TOOK POLICY - PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY 
Coverage has been added for GREGORY J OLSEN effective 9/19/1971. Coverage 
will be discontinued 2/4/1992. 
Coverage has been discontinued for GREGORY J OLSEN effective 2/4/1992. 
: BNIBLSEN 
